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UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ-
VELASQUEZ: WHAT IS A 
“REASONABLE POSSIBILITY” OF 
APPARENT ELIGIBILITY FOR 
RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION? 
KRISTINA M. SEIL*
INTRODUCTION
Merriam-Webster defines deportation as “the removal from a 
country of an alien whose presence is unlawful or prejudicial” and 
provides “the deportation of Jews from Spain in 1492” as an example.1
Historically, deportations have been isolated mass expulsions of people 
deemed “undesirable” (usually on the basis of religion or ethnicity) in 
their countries of residence.2  Due process—the concept of notice and a 
fair chance to be heard3—was alien to these historical deportations.4
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; M.A., University of San Francisco; B.A., University of California at Santa Cruz.  My 
thanks go out to all who have patiently helped me write and edit this article, and to friends and 
family for their constant support—especially my Granny, who is always “perfect,” and my Grandma, 
who taught me that “smak og behag, kan du ikke diskutere.” 
1 Deportation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM , www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
deportation (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
2 See, e.g., Benjamin Gray, From Exile of Citizens to Deportation of Non-Citizens: Ancient 
Greece as a Mirror to Illuminate a Modern Transition, 15 OXFORD J. CITIZENSHIP STUD. 565, 565-
67 (2011) (describing the practices of expulsion of noncitizens as well as exile and outlawing of 
citizens in Ancient Greece, and comparing the latter practices to modern deportation). 
3 See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597-98 (1953). 
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The rise of the nation-state coupled with the greater mobility of people 
led to an increase in deportation-like phenomena, such as the deportation 
of criminals from England to its colonies,5 or the expulsion of ethnic 
Poles from Prussia.6  Deportation7 today is an industry in its own right—
in 2010, the United States deported nearly 400,000 noncitizens, up from 
fewer than 300,000 in 2007.8  Despite the significant interests at stake—
family unity, 9 property rights,10 and community interests11—noncitizen 
respondents12 in immigration proceedings are not entitled to government-
appointed counsel.13
4 Unlike in the case of exile of citizens, little protection was afforded noncitizens against the 
“deportations” of history. See, e.g., Gray, From Exile of Citizens to Deportation of Non-Citizens: 
Ancient Greece as a Mirror to Illuminate a Modern Transition, 15 OXFORD J. CITIZENSHIP STUD. at
565. 
5 See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1308-
09 (2011) (pointing to the punitive nature of the historical deportation-like practice of banishment in 
England); Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British 
Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 
116-17 (1999) (arguing that the British practice of “banishment” is an antecedent to modern 
deportation and establishes that deportation is a form of punishment). 
6 See, e.g., Expulsion of Poles by Germany, SOURCES.COM, www.sources.com/SSR/Docs/ 
SSRW-Expulsion_of_Poles_by_Germany.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
7 Although the word “removal” is used in lieu of “deportation” to describe the procedure, 
the term “deportation” continues to be useful and descriptive.  Indeed, this is the term used by the 
Ninth Circuit in the decision discussed.  See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
8 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE TOTAL REMOVALS THROUGH 
JULY 31ST, 2011, available at www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ero-removals.pdf; see also
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, TRAC REPORTS, INC., SYRACUSE 
UNIVERSITY, CURRENT ICE REMOVALS OF NONCITIZENS EXCEED NUMBERS UNDER BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/234/; Shankar 
Vedantam, United States Deportations Reach Record High, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2010, available at
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/06/AR2010100607232.html. 
9 See, e.g., Ana Tintocalis, Students Suffer When Deportation Tears Families Apart,
KPBS.ORG (May 17, 2010), www.kpbs.org/news/2010/may/17/the-impact-of-deportation-on-
students/.
10 As an example of property lost through deportation, the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office 
reported $6 million in seized property last year from deported immigrants.  See Ginnie Graham , 
Legislative Panel Seeks Immigration Reform, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 7, 2011, available at
www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=11&articleid=20110307_11_A1_Ihlryo165451. 
11 Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda & Marshall Fitz, A Rising Tide or a Shrinking Pie: The Economic 
Impact of Legalization Versus Deportation in Arizona, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 2011), 
available at www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/pdf/rising_tide.pdf (analyzing the economic 
impact of immigration and deportation). 
12 Individuals in immigration proceedings are called “respondents” because they “respond” 
to a summoning document called the “Notice to Appear.”  Outside of immigration proceedings, the 
term “alien” appears in immigration statutes and regulations.  Immigration caselaw variously uses 
the terms “alien,” “noncitizen,” “petitioner” (before the Circuit Courts of Appeals) and 
“respondent.”  This Note will use the term “noncitizen” instead of “alien.” 
13 Although noncitizens have a right to counsel if they are in criminal proceedings, there is 
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Unlike its historical counterparts, however, modern deportation 
procedure is circumscribed by regulations intended to guarantee fairness 
and uniformity.14  Federal regulations thus mandate that immigration 
judges inform noncitizens of their eligibility for relief from deportation 
in an effort to ensure that unrepresented respondents in immigration 
proceedings make informed decisions.15
Unhappily, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
recently limited this regulation-mandated duty to inform.  In United
States v. Lopez-Velasquez, the Ninth Circuit held that the duty to inform 
is not triggered when sources outside the Ninth Circuit indicate that relief 
may be possible because the relevant Ninth Circuit precedent is no 
longer correct.16  In United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, a noncitizen 
defendant named Edmundo Lopez-Velasquez argued that he had been 
deported from the United States without due process because an 
immigration judge did not inform him that he may have been eligible for 
relief from deportation under former section 212(c)17 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA).  In 1995, the year after he was deported, a 
Ninth Circuit decision found that noncitizens in Lopez-Velasquez’s 
position could be eligible for relief under section 212(c).18  On appeal 
before the Ninth Circuit, Lopez-Velasquez argued that the immigration 
judge’s failure to inform him of this potential relief rendered Lopez-
Velasquez’s decision to waive appeal uninformed and unintelligent.19
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in immigration proceedings. Due process under the Fifth 
Amendment provides that noncitizens may retain an attorney in immigration proceedings, but not at 
the government’s expense. See, e.g., Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” to Counsel in Removal 
Proceedings, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 169 (2010). 
14 See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1655 (1992). 
15 Relief from deportation refers generally to any legal argument that can prevent a 
noncitizen from being deported. This includes such forms of relief as asylum and cancellation of 
removal; historically it also included suspension of deportation and relief under section 212(c).  See 
United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
16 See generally United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010). 
17 At the time of Lopez-Velasquez’s original deportation, INA section 212(c) provided for 
relief from deportation for an “aggravated felony” for a legal permanent resident with seven years of 
“lawful unrelinquished domicile” whose criminal sentence did not exceed five years.  Immigration 
and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187 
(1952), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996); see also Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok II), 681 F.2d 107, 
108 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982); Brent S. Wible, The Strange Afterlife of Section 212(c) Relief: Collateral 
Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 455, 463-64 (2005). 
18 Ortega de Robles v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1995). 
19 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895-96; see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 
828 (1987). 
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Therefore, Lopez-Velasquez contended, the deportation proceeding 
lacked due process.20
Relying on a 1979 decision to find that relief was not possible, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected Lopez-Velasquez’s argument, holding that the 
duty to inform “is limited to informing an alien of a reasonable 
possibility that the alien is eligible for relief at the time of the hearing.”21
 Prior to its holding in Lopez-Velasquez, the Ninth Circuit maintained 
that the duty to inform is triggered where “there is a reasonable 
possibility that the petitioner may be eligible for relief.”22  Under this 
standard, it was not necessary for a respondent to ultimately prevail on a 
claim for relief, and the reasonable possibility that a respondent may 
have been eligible was sufficient to trigger the judge’s duty to inform.23
In Lopez-Velasquez, the Ninth Circuit limited this standard by finding 
that, if Ninth Circuit precedent appears to preclude relief, there is no duty 
to inform even when legal sources outside the Ninth Circuit suggest that 
this precedent has been invalidated.24
This Note evaluates whether the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United
States v. Lopez-Velasquez comports with established immigration due 
process standards, focusing on the immigration judge’s duty to inform 
noncitizen respondents of relief from deportation.  Part I outlines the 
facts and procedural history of United States v. Lopez-Velasquez.  Part II 
explains due process standards in immigration proceedings and the 
standard that triggers an immigration judge’s duty to inform respondents 
of relief.  Part III analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lopez-
Velasquez and argues that the facts were sufficient to require the 
immigration judge to inform Lopez-Velasquez of his potential argument 
for relief from deportation.  The Note concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in United States v. Lopez-Velasquez departs from established due 
process requirements. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-
VELASQUEZ
Edmundo Lopez-Velasquez entered the United States illegally in the 
early 1980s as a seasonal agricultural laborer, but soon legalized his 
20 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895-96. 
21 Id. at 901 (emphasis added). 
22 Moran-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). 
23 Id. at 423. 
24 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895. 
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status.25  In 1986, as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA), Congress established the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) 
Program to provide a pathway to legal permanent residence for certain 
agricultural laborers.26  Lopez-Velasquez took the opportunity presented 
by the SAW Program to legitimize his status in the United States.27  He 
acquired legal permanent resident status in October 1987, married a U.S. 
citizen, and became the father of two children who were also U.S. 
citizens.28  Unfortunately, in 1993 Lopez-Velasquez was arrested and 
convicted for delivery of a controlled substance.29  He was sentenced to 
eight months in prison.30  After serving his time, he was then 
automatically placed in deportation proceedings.31
Lopez-Velasquez was not represented in his group deportation 
proceeding, and the immigration judge did not inform him that he had an 
argument for relief from deportation.32  In this group deportation, an 
immigration judge “heard” Lopez-Velasquez’s case as part of a group 
proceeding that included the cases of several other noncitizens.33  The 
immigration judge asked counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS)34 whether any of the respondents qualified for relief from 
deportation.35  When counsel for the INS responded that he did not 
believe so, the immigration judge ordered all the respondents deported.36
Since the immigration judge’s actions made it seem as though no relief  
25 Id. at 895-96. 
26 Id. The SAW program was temporary and is no longer in effect, but it was passed to allow 
noncitizens working in agriculture in the United States without documentation the opportunity to 
legalize their status, with the potential to become legal permanent residents. See also 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1160 (Westlaw 2011). 
27 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895-96. 
28 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 568 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc 
granted, 599 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2010), and on reh’g en banc, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010). 
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895-96. 
32 Id.; see also United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) 
(noting that group deportations are permissible if conducted with due process). 
33 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895-96. 
34 The INS has since been incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
See The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
35 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895-96. 
36 Id.  It is improper for the immigration judge to rely solely on the representations and 
findings of the government. See United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Without any independent inquiry of the petitioner, and depending solely on information provided 
by DHS, the IJ concluded that Ramos had ‘voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently’ waived his due 
process rights. As we have noted, ‘shortcuts frequently turn out to be mistakes.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
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was available to him, Lopez-Velasquez waived his right to appeal and 
was deported.37
In order to rejoin his family, Lopez-Velasquez reentered the United 
States twice following his initial deportation.38  He was deported in 2003 
and was placed in deportation proceedings again in 2006.39  Lopez-
Velasquez argued in both proceedings that his original deportation 
violated due process.40  During the 2006 proceedings, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Oregon ruled in favor of Lopez-Velasquez, 
stating that he had a colorable claim for relief under former INA section 
212(c), of which the immigration judge failed to inform him.41  Thus, the 
district court found that Lopez-Velasquez was denied due process.42  The 
government appealed.43
A Ninth Circuit panel issued a unanimous opinion affirming the 
district court’s decision in favor of Lopez-Velasquez, reasoning that the 
immigration judge’s failure to inform Lopez-Velasquez of his potential 
for relief constituted a violation of due process.44  In a rehearing en 
banc,45 however, the Ninth Circuit reversed both the panel decision and 
district court’s judgment, holding that the immigration judge was not 
required to inform Lopez-Velasquez of relief at the time of his original 
deportation, in part because then-current Ninth Circuit jurisprudence 
seemed to indicate that relief was not possible.46
II. RELEVANT LAW: DUE PROCESS, THE DUTY TO INFORM, AND 
ELIGIBILITY FOR RELIEF
The central issue in Lopez-Velasquez was whether, at the time of his 
original deportation, Lopez-Velasquez had a colorable legal argument for 
37 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895-96. 






44 Id. at 897. 
45 Law French for “on the bench,” en banc means “with all the judges present and 
participating; in full court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 606 (9th ed. 2009). Because of its size, the 
Ninth Circuit ordinarily uses a limited en banc court, consisting of the Chief Judge of the circuit plus 
ten additional judges drawn by lot from the pool of active judges. Rarely, a case heard by a limited 
en banc court may be reheard by the full court. See 9th Cir. R. 35-3; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) 
(Westlaw 2011); Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (authorizing limited en banc courts 
for courts of appeals having more than fifteen active judges). Lopez-Velasquez was decided by a 
limited en banc court.  See 629 F.3d at 895. 
46 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 897. 
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relief sufficient to trigger the duty to inform required for due process.47
Because Lopez-Velasquez was not only ordered deported but also 
charged with illegal reentry (a criminal offense punishable by up to 
twenty years in prison), his prosecutors were required to show that his 
original deportation was valid,48 that is, conducted with due process.49
This section will describe the level of due process required in 
immigration proceedings, as well as the role of an immigration judge’s 
duty to inform. 
47 Id. at 896. 
48 Both illegal entry and illegal reentry carry criminal charges separate from their 
immigration consequences.  See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326 (Westlaw 2011); see also United States v. 
Gonzalez-Ruiz, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155-56 (N.D. Cal. 2005).  Criminal prosecution for illegal 
reentry requires that the underlying deportation not be fundamentally unfair or deprive the alien of 
the opportunity for judicial review. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(d) (Westlaw 2011). Underlying deportation 
procedures can be collaterally attacked in defense against a charge of criminal reentry. Id.; see 
generally United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (finding no due process in a group 
deportation where none of the respondents had been informed of potential relief); Brent S. Wible, 
The Strange Afterlife of Section 212(c) Relief: Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders in 
Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 455, 462 (2005); see also 
United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Criminal convictions are 
the result of a proceeding with all the constitutional safeguards.  Respondents in a civil deportation 
hearing, however, are not entitled to the same constitutional rights afforded a criminal defendant. . . . 
Therefore, before imposing a § 1326 felony conviction which carries a prison sentence, the district 
court should be able to review the legality of an underlying deportation order obtained without the 
benefit of the same constitutional protection that is extended to criminal defendants.  See, e.g.,
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply to a deportation 
proceeding); Ramirez v. I.N.S., 550 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1977) (no Sixth Amendment right to 
appointed counsel in deportation proceedings); Trias-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 528 F.2d 366, 368-69 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (failure to give Miranda warnings does not preclude use of alien’s statements in a 
deportation hearing); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923) (Fifth 
Amendment refusal to testify may form the basis of inferences against alien in the deportation 
hearing).”).
49 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(d) (Westlaw 2011); see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 840.  The 
Supreme Court in Mendoza-Lopez affirmed that a failure to inform could compromise due process 
such that a deportation order suffering from this flaw could not be used as an element of criminal 
reentry.  Id.  In Mendoza-Lopez, an immigration judge failed to inform noncitizens of their eligibility 
for relief from deportation.  Id.  The Court explained that, since the respondents in this group 
deportation had not been informed of relief, their waivers of appeal were therefore not “considered 
and intelligent” and thus these noncitizens had been “deprived of judicial review of their deportation 
proceeding.” Id.  Because the underlying deportations lacked due process, the Court stated that the 
government could not rely on these invalid deportation orders as “reliable proof” of an element in a 
criminal offense.  Id.  After the Supreme Court’s holding in Mendoza-Lopez, Congress clarified that 
a collateral attack on a deportation proceeding could be made on due process grounds because, if a 
deportation is carried out without due process, it cannot be the basis of subsequent charges.  See 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1326(d) (Westlaw 2011); see also Wible, The Strange Afterlife of Section 212(c) Relief: 
Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. at 462. 
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A. DUE PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
Although noncitizens have no substantive due process right to 
receive benefits in immigration proceedings, procedural due process 
rights have long been recognized, particularly in the context of 
deportation.50  The procedural protections available in deportation 
proceedings do not rise to the level of those available in criminal law 
because deportation is not considered punishment.51  For example, in 
immigration proceedings, there is no right to government-appointed 
counsel, no right to exclude hearsay evidence, and the Double Jeopardy 
Clause has no application.52  In addition, Congress’s power to regulate 
immigration is plenary, effectively limiting the courts’ ability to 
delineate constitutional protections in this field.53
As early as 1903, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
right to procedural due process for noncitizens in deportation 
proceedings, writing: 
[A]n alien who has entered the country, and has become subject in all 
respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although 
alleged to be illegally here, [cannot] be taken into custody and 
deported without [an] opportunity to be heard upon the questions 
involving his right to be and remain in the United States.54
Although the extent of procedural due process in immigration 
proceedings has been contested,55 due process requirements, in general, 
are stronger in deportation than exclusion proceedings.56  Noncitizens 
50 See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the 
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 307-13 (2000); 
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 
2004); Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v. 
Jauregui, 314 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2003); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 
F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983); Walter S. Gindin, 
(Potentially) Resolving the Ever-Present Debate over Whether Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings 
Have a Due-Process Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 96 IOWA L. REV. 669 (2011). 
51 See Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the 
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. at 307-13. 
52 Id.; see also United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1985). 
53 See Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the 
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. at 307-13. 
54 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); see also Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673, 
681-82 (1912) (agency decisions should still comply with “the fundamental principles of justice 
embraced within the conception of due process of law”). 
55 See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). 
56 Exclusion proceedings are meant to “exclude” arriving noncitizens who are inadmissible 
8
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who have been living in the United States are entitled to a higher level of 
due process than noncitizens recently arriving in the United States, 
because their interest in remaining is deemed stronger due to their more 
extensive ties to the community.57
Procedural regulations promulgated by the Attorney General 
determine due process in deportation proceedings.58  The immigration 
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) have a special duty 
to adhere to these regulations.59  Indeed, the Attorney General has argued 
that the procedural due process constraints set forth in regulations apply 
with especial force to actions “as they pertain[] to ‘proceedings before 
the immigration judge or the [BIA]’ itself.”60  For example, in Orantes-
Hernandez v. Thornburgh, the Ninth Circuit found that the right to obtain 
counsel—at the noncitizens’ own expense—was set out in regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General.61  The court held that the INS 
violated due process when it prevented a group of Salvadoran refugees 
from obtaining counsel.62  Failure to follow the procedures outlined in 
the federal regulations can thus constitute a violation of due process.63
B. THE DUTY TO INFORM
One essential procedural safeguard required by the regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General is the immigration judge’s duty to 
inform.64 The Attorney General derives authority in immigration law 
to the United States, while deportation proceedings are meant to deport removable noncitizens.  See
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and 
begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes 
accordingly. Our cases have frequently suggested that a continuously present resident alien is 
entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation, and, although we have only rarely held 
that the procedures provided by the executive were inadequate, we developed the rule that a 
continuously present permanent resident alien has a right to due process in such a situation.”) (citing 
United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133-34 (1924); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 
460, 468 (1912) (hearing may be conclusive “when fairly conducted”); United States ex rel. Vajtauer 
v. Comm’r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 
100-01 (1903); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 
U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945)). 
57 Landon, 459 U.S. at 32. 
58 Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for 
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. at 1641. 
59 Brief for the Respondent at 6, Afanwi v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 350 (2009) (No. 08-906), 2009 
WL 2625869 (analysis of the Attorney General). 
60 Id.
61 Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990). 
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 (recodified as 8 C.F.R. § 1240.49 (Westlaw 2011)). 
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from the Immigration and Nationality Act.65  Specifically, section 
103(a)(3) of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to “establish such 
regulations . . . as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority 
under the provisions of this Act.”66  Pursuant to INA section 103(a)(3), 
the Attorney General promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) to address due 
process issues for unrepresented and often uninformed respondents in 
immigration proceedings.67  Section 242.17(a), which was renumbered in 
2006 as § 1240.49,68 states that “[t]he immigration judge shall inform the 
respondent of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the 
benefits enumerated in this paragraph and shall afford the respondent an 
opportunity to make application therefore during the hearing.”69
The regulation makes no mention of the probability of the 
noncitizen’s success in such an application, but only requires that the 
opportunity be given to noncitizens who are “apparently” eligible.70  One 
leading commentator at the time of the initial passage of the INA 
remarked that access to information was notably lacking in immigration 
procedures and that, at that time, immigration officers were not required 
to be legally trained.71  Another commentator who argued that 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.49 should be construed broadly to protect the few constitutional 
rights noncitizens possess stated: 
65 See INA § 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3).  The 1952 Immigration and Naturalization 
Act still comprises the bulk of immigration law in the United States; see also IMMIGRATION AND 
NATIONALITY ACT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=f3829
c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000
045f3d6a1RCRD (last visited Aug. 31, 2011). 
66 Id.
67 Michael D. Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens Must Be Informed by Immigration Judges of 
the Availability of Relief from Deportation When Record Raises Inference That a Reasonable 
Possibility for Relief Exists, Moran-Enriquez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 884 F.2d 
420 (9th Cir.1989), 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 645, 656 (1991) (internal citations omitted) 
[hereinafter Anderson, Aliens Must Be Informed of Relief].
68 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 is currently reserved, but the text was recodified without alteration as 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.49 (Westlaw 2011). 
69 8 C.F.R. § 1240.49 (Westlaw 2011). 
70 Id.; see also Moran-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 884 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1989); Anderson, Case 
Comment, Aliens Must Be Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 652. 
71 Franz M. Oppenheimer, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 115, 115-16 (1955) (reviewing 
FRANK L. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1955)) (noting also that “[t]he 
Act and the Regulations constitute . . . an unspeakable quagmire, treacherous even for the expert. . . .  
And the incidence of misinformation emanating from other presumably authoritative sources in this 
field is, in the experience of this reviewer, great enough to jeopardize the decent application of the 
law.”).
10
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Aliens . . . have traditionally been afforded few constitutional 
protections in deportation proceedings. It is in light of the historic 
treatment of aliens that 8 C.F.R. § [1240.49] must be analyzed. 
Because the constitutional rights that aliens have are not as broad as 
those afforded United States citizens, the rights they do have under 
statutes and regulations should not be narrowly construed, but rather 
read to give the alien the fullest protection permissible.72
The immigration judge’s disclosure to noncitizens of their “apparent 
eligibility to apply for” relief is therefore required by 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.49.73  This does not mean that the noncitizen will actually be 
eligible for relief.74  The regulation simply requires the immigration 
judge to inform a respondent when eligibility for relief is “apparent.”75
Furthermore, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits have explicitly held that an immigration judge’s failure to 
inform noncitizens of their eligibility for relief from deportation violates 
due process.76
The Ninth Circuit outlined the scope of an immigration judge’s duty 
to inform in Moran-Enriquez v. I.N.S.77  Respondent Moran-Enriquez 
was a legal permanent resident married to a U.S. citizen; his children 
were also U.S. citizens.78  He was convicted of a “crime involving moral 
turpitude,” an offense that made him deportable.79  The Ninth Circuit 
considered his permanent resident status and the hardship his family 
72 Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens Must Be Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L
L.J. at 656 (footnotes omitted). 
73 8 C.F.R. § 1240.49 (Westlaw 2011); Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 422; Anderson, Case 
Comment, Aliens Must Be Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 656. 
74 8 C.F.R. § 1240.49 (Westlaw 2011); Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 422; Anderson, Case 
Comment, Aliens Must Be Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 656. 
75 8 C.F.R. § 1240.49 (Westlaw 2011); Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 422; Anderson, Case 
Comment, Aliens Must Be Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 656. 
76 See United States v. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen the 
record before the [IJ] raises a reasonable possibility of relief from deportation under this provision, it 
is a denial of due process to fail to inform an alien of that possibility at the deportation hearing.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 
2000))); see also United States v. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724, 730 (7th Cir. 2003) (addressing a 
distinction “between an alien’s claim that she has a right to seek discretionary relief, and the very 
different claim that she has a right to have that discretion exercised in a particular way”); United 
States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding deportation proceeding fundamentally 
unfair when ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in an alien who was “eligible for § 212(c) 
relief and could have made a strong showing in support of such relief” failing to apply for waiver). 
77 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 422; see also Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens Must Be 
Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 656. 
78 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 422. 
79 Id. at 421; see also Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens Must Be Informed of Relief, 14 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 657. 
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would face upon his deportation and found he was “apparently eligible” 
for relief from deportation under INA section 212(h).80  The standard 
announced in Moran-Enriquez is that, under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.49, an 
immigration judge “must” inform respondents in deportation hearings of 
“apparent eligibility” for relief.81  The Ninth Circuit in Moran-Enriquez 
explained the “apparent eligibility” standard as follows: 
We read the “apparent eligibility” standard of 8 C.F.R. section 
[1240.49] to mean that where the record, fairly reviewed by an 
individual who is intimately familiar with the immigration laws—as 
[immigration judges] no doubt are—raises a reasonable possibility that 
the petitioner may be eligible for relief, the [immigration judge] must 
advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to 
develop the issue.82
Thus, even though a noncitizen may not have a complete showing of 
eligibility, if there is a “reasonable possibility” of relief, then the 
immigration judge must inform the noncitizen of that relief and give him 
or her the opportunity to obtain evidence and argue for potential relief.83
Thus, an immigration judge has a mandatory duty to inform if the record 
“raises a reasonable possibility that the petitioner may be eligible for 
relief.”84
In United States v. Bui, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that failure to 
inform of the potential for relief results in an invalid deportation order.85
Bui had entered the United States from Vietnam when he was sixteen 
years old.86  During Bui’s deportation proceedings, the immigration 
judge failed to consider that Bui might have United States citizen or legal 
permanent resident relatives whose existence could provide Bui relief 
from deportation.87  Even though the record before the immigration 
judge did not reveal any relatives, the Ninth Circuit determined that, 
because of Bui’s young age, the possibility that such relatives existed 
80 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 422; see also Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens Must Be 
Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 655. 
81 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 422; see also Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens Must Be 
Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 652. 
82 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 423. 
83 Id.
84 Id. (emphasis added). 
85 Bui v. I.N.S., 76 F.3d 268 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Thomas G. LaRussa,  Ninth Circuit 
Finds Reversible Error in Failure of IJ to Grant Deported Alien Right to Choose Country Of 
Deportation: Failure Excludability is Error, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 564 (1996). 
86 Bui, 76 F.3d at 269. 
87 Id.
12
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was strong enough to trigger the duty to inform.88  The Ninth Circuit 
scrutinized the duty established under § 1240.49 and, citing Moran-
Enriquez, summarized: “‘Apparent eligibility’ is a reasonable possibility 
that the alien may be eligible for relief.”89  The Ninth Circuit held that 
even though the record did not directly report the existence of qualifying 
relatives, failure to consider the fact that Bui might have such relatives 
and therefore inform him of his potential relief was reversible error.90
The decisions of the Ninth Circuit establish that an immigration 
judge’s duty to inform is triggered when there is a “reasonable 
possibility” that the noncitizen is eligible for relief from deportation.91
In Moran-Enriquez, the Ninth Circuit held that the duty to inform is 
triggered when there is a reasonable possibility that the petitioner may be 
eligible for relief.92  In Bui, the court held that the duty applied even 
when the record only suggested facts demonstrating relief.93  The 
deportation of a noncitizen who has not been informed of potential relief 
and subsequently waives the right to appeal lacks due process because 
waiver of appeal must be intelligent and informed.94  If an immigration 
judge fails to inform a noncitizen in deportation procedures of potential 
relief, the deportation is most likely invalid for lack of due process.95
C. ELIGIBILITY FOR RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION
Since an immigration judge’s duty to inform arises when there is a 
reasonable possibility that a noncitizen is eligible for relief from 
deportation, it is critical to know what relief from deportation entails.96
As the court in Moran-Enriquez noted, there is “no doubt” that an 
immigration judge is an expert in immigration law and is well qualified 
88 Id.
89 Id. at 270. 
90 Id. at 271 (“Here, the record disclosed that Bui entered the United States at sixteen years of 
age under lawful permanent resident status; this also should have raised an inference of the existence 
of relatives and the possibility of relief.”). 
91 See, e.g., Moran-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989); Bui, 76 F.3d at 
270. 
92 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 423. 
93 Bui, 76 F.3d at 271. 
94 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(d) (Westlaw 2011); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 
840 (1987). 
95 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (1996); see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 840; Bui, 76 
F.3d 268; Thomas G. LaRussa,  Ninth Circuit Finds Reversible Error in Failure of IJ to Grant 
Deported Alien Right to Choose Country Of Deportation: Failure Excludability is Error, 10 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 564 (1996). 
96 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 423; see also Michael D. Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens 
Must Be Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 645, 646 (1991). 
13
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to recognize when a noncitizen is eligible for an immigration benefit, 
including relief from deportation.97  The following section outlines 
212(c), a relevant form of relief that would have been known to an 
immigration judge during the period of inquiry. 
1. Immigration and Nationality Act Section 212(c) and the Question of 
Domicile
The type of relief that might have been available to Lopez-
Velasquez was known as relief under INA section 212(c).98  Relief from 
deportation has taken various forms over the years; however, before 
passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) in 1996, relief under INA section 212(c) was one of the most 
important forms of relief from deportation.99  Section 212(c) replaced the 
“seventh proviso” of the Immigration Act of 1917, which provided that 
any noncitizen returning from a temporary absence abroad could not be 
excluded as inadmissible if he or she had acquired seven years of 
unrelinquished domicile in the United States.100  Since this “seventh 
proviso” had not even required that noncitizens domiciled in the United 
States be in legal status, section 212(c) made these requirements more 
rigorous in that domicile must have been “lawful” and noncitizens 
seeking relief under section 212(c) must be legal permanent residents at 
the time of relief.101
A further modification to section 212(c) extended relief to legal 
permanent residents who had not left the United States but who had 
become deportable through the commission of an “aggravated felony” 
(including the crime of trafficking in a controlled substance).102
However, relief was available only to a noncitizen who had not served a 
criminal sentence of more than five years.  Thus, in 1994,103 section 
212(c) relief was available to a legal permanent resident with seven years 
97 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 423; see also Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens Must Be 
Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 646. 
98 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
99 See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 289 (2001). 
100 Mark Figueiredo, Butros v. INS: The Folly of Finality as an Absolute Bar to Seeking 
§212(c) Relief from Deportation, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 607, 615-617 (1994). 
101 Id. at 615-618. 
102 See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). After IIRIRA, an “aggravated felony” refers 
broadly to a number of crimes, including gambling and fraud. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Before 
IIRIRA, it referred more narrowly to possession of firearms, drug trafficking and murder. See Pub. 
L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). 
103 This date is important because it was the year in which Lopez-Velasquez was deported. 
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of lawful unrelinquished domicile who had not served a term of 
imprisonment for five years or more for an aggravated felony.104
Determining whether a noncitizen has acquired seven years of 
“lawful unrelinquished domicile” for the purposes of section 212(c) 
hinges on whether the noncitizen could acquire domicile while residing 
in the United States in a legal status other than that of a legal permanent 
resident.105  Between 1979 and 1995, the Ninth Circuit and other courts 
of appeals issued mixed rulings regarding whether non-permanent 
residents could acquire domicile, but the trend favored allowing 
noncitizens to acquire domicile outside of legal permanent residency.106
In Castillo-Felix v. I.N.S., the Ninth Circuit held that noncitizens who 
were not legal permanent residents could not acquire domicile.107  In 
1995, the Ninth Circuit overturned Castillo-Felix and held that 
noncitizens who were not permanent residents could acquire domicile.108
However, even before the Ninth Circuit overturned Castillo-Felix,
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).  
When read in light of decisions of the United States Supreme Court and 
of other circuits’ decisions, IRCA’s passage indicated that noncitizens 
who were not legal permanent residents could acquire domicile—the 
biggest question involved in determining Lopez-Velasquez’s eligibility 
for relief.109
104 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 296-97. 
105 Figueiredo, Butros v. INS: The Folly of Finality as an Absolute Bar to Seeking §212(c) 
Relief from Deportation, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. at 615–17. 
106 Ortega de Robles v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1995); Castellon-Contreras v. 
I.N.S., 45 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1995) (alien gained lawful domicile for purposes of § 212(c) on 
date that he applied for amnesty under IRCA); compare Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok I), 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 
1977), with Castillo-Felix v. I.N.S., 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979). 
107 Castillo-Felix, 601 F.2d at 467. 
108 Ortega de Robles, 58 F.3d at 1361. 
109 See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 568 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Although 
in Castillo-Felix v. INS, we determined that an alien must have permanent residency to establish 
such ‘lawful unrelinquished domicile,’ the intervening enactment of IRCA’s amnesty programs 
raised the reasonable possibility that Castillo-Felix no longer remained controlling law. Indeed, a 
year after Lopez-Velasquez’s removal proceeding, we held that IRCA superseded Castillo-Felix. We 
concluded that ‘lawful unrelinquished domicile’ includes the period of temporary residency granted 
by the § 245A general amnesty provision of the IRCA, because during that time an alien is lawfully 
and physically present and intends to remain in the United States.”) (citing Ortega de Robles, 58 
F.3d at 1360-61), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
15
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2. Requirements for Domicile: The Lawful Intent to Remain 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that a noncitizen 
could acquire domicile if he or she was physically present and intended 
to remain in the United States, and both the physical presence and intent 
to remain were “lawful” under the terms of the noncitizen’s visa.110
Most groups of noncitizens are by law foreclosed from forming an intent 
to remain.  For instance, if a noncitizen, such as a student from abroad, 
forms an intent to remain in the United States while holding a 
nonimmigrant visa, his or her presence automatically becomes 
“unlawful.”111  However, the passage of IRCA altered the landscape of 
the law, allowing non-permanent residents to form the intent to remain. 
Before the passage of IRCA, the U.S. Supreme Court in Elkins v. 
Moreno examined congressional intent regarding whether 
“nonimmigrant” noncitizens (i.e., lawfully present noncitizens who were 
not legal permanent residents) could acquire domicile if they lawfully 
intend to remain in the United States.112  The Court explained that while 
Congress had restricted certain noncitizens from immigrating by 
requiring that they not abandon their residences abroad, it did not require 
certain other classes of nonimmigrants to maintain their foreign 
residences.113  Thus, reasoned the Court, these nonimmigrants were 
“nonrestricted.”114  The Supreme Court stated that “Congress, while 
anticipating that permanent immigration would normally occur through 
immigrant channels, was willing to allow nonrestricted nonimmigrant 
110 In re Lok, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 109-10 (BIA 1981); see also In re Carrasco, 16 I. & N. 
Dec. 195, 197 (BIA 1977). Outside of the Second Circuit, the BIA also held that section 212(c) relief 
required seven years of lawful permanent residence, but after the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Ortega
de Robles, the BIA agreed that IRCA had changed the statutory scheme such that congressional 
intent supported an argument that domicile could be acquired outside of legal permanent residence. 
See In re Cazares-Alvarez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 188, 197 (BIA 1996) (stating that “[i]f Congress has not 
addressed the precise issue the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based upon a 
permissible construction of the statute” and that the Ninth Circuit found that “the statutory scheme 
no longer supports” the interpretation that domicile could only be acquired by legal permanent 
residents) (internal quotations omitted). 
111 In re Lok, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 108 (“In order for an alien to establish a domicile in the 
United States, he must be physically present in this country and have the intention of residing here 
permanently or indefinitely. For that domicile to be considered ‘lawful,’ however, the alien’s 
presence here must be lawful within the meaning of this country’s immigration laws. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act sanctions the continuing presence in this country of but one class of 
aliens other than those lawfully admitted for permanent residence, namely, nonimmigrants in 
compliance with the terms and conditions of their admission.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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aliens to adopt the United States as their domicile.”115  Congress’s 
flexibility in defining “domicile” raised a fair possibility that noncitizen, 
nonimmigrants who were not required to maintain a residence abroad 
(and were thus “nonrestricted”) could adopt the United States as their 
domicile.116
A growing trend among the circuits also indicated that 
nonimmigrant, noncitizens could establish lawful domicile.117  In two 
decisions regarding the same noncitizen, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit interpreted “lawful domicile” to encompass domicile for 
noncitizens with legal nonimmigrant status—not just permanent resident 
status.118  In Lok I and Lok II, the Second Circuit explained that legal 
permanent residence has a specific definition under immigration law that 
is distinct from the concept of domicile.119  The court reasoned in Lok I
that “it is possible for aliens to possess a lawful domicile in this country 
without being admitted for permanent residence.”120  It further noted in 
Lok II that the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding in Castillo-Felix was 
“open to question.”121  Thus, the Second Circuit recognized certain 
lawfully present noncitizens could acquire domicile, even if they were 
not permanent residents.122
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in Lok I, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit clarified that the 
distinguishing element in establishing domicile is the intent to remain,123
and further stated that an individual might establish domicile if he or she 
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Melian v. I.N.S., 987 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993); Prichard-Ciriza v. I.N.S., 978 F.2d 
219, 224 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992); Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok II), 681 F.2d 107, 108 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982); Anwo v. 
I.N.S., 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Francis v. I.N.S., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
118 See Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok I), 548 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); Lok II, 681 F.2d at 109 
(“Thousands of aliens could become lawful domiciliaries without becoming permanent residents 
under Elkins and Tim Lok I.”). 
119 Lok I, 548 F.2d at 40 (“The phrase ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ is a 
carefully defined term, 8 U.S.C. s 1101(a)(20), and does not bear the same meaning as the words 
‘lawful unrelinquished domicile.’”). 
120 Id.
121 Lok II, 681 F.2d at 110 n.4. 
122 Lok I, 548 F.2d at 40. 
123 Anwo v. I.N.S., 607 F.2d 435, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see Gilbert v. David, 235 
U.S. 561, 569 (1915); Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954) (“Residence in fact, and the 
intention of making the place of residence one’s home, are essential elements of domicile.”).  Intent 
to remain distinguishes “domicile” from “residence,” which is defined in the Act as the “principal, 
actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(33) (Westlaw 2011); 
see also Bache Halsey Stuart Inc. v. Namm, 446 F. Supp. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“It is well 
established that domicile entails not only residence in fact, but also intent to make that place of 
residence one’s home.”). 
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“intends to reside permanently or indefinitely in the new location.”124
The court held that a noncitizen on a student visa, who was not lawfully 
able to intend to remain in the United States, could not establish domicile 
because the terms of the visa prevented it.125  However, this holding left 
open the possibility that a noncitizen whose visa allowed for an intent to 
reside permanently in the United States could lawfully establish 
domicile.126
In Prichard-Ciriza v. I.N.S., the Fifth Circuit addressed a 
hypothetical situation in which a noncitizen had maintained lawful status 
before becoming a legal permanent resident, and theorized that domicile 
could accrue in lawful nonimmigrant status.127  The Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that a noncitizen who had legal status under a visa that had not 
expired might acquire time toward establishing domicile even before 
adjusting status to that of a permanent resident.128
In Melian v. I.N.S., the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
recognized that the Supreme Court’s holding in Elkins meant that non-
permanent residents could acquire domicile.129  Moreover, it reasoned 
that this interpretation was the most consistent with the requirements of 
section 212(c), since the statute required legal permanent residence as 
well as seven years of domicile, rather than simply requiring seven years 
of legal permanent residence (which would have also captured the 
physical presence and intent of domicile).130  The Eleventh Circuit held 
that while a noncitizen who did not have legal status could not acquire 
domicile, one whose legal status was other than that of a permanent 
resident, but who could still hold the intent to remain, could indeed be 
domiciled in the United States for the purposes of section 212(c) 
relief.131  Thus, the precedent of the Supreme Court as well as many of 
the circuits had acknowledged the possibility of noncitizens who were 
not legal permanent residents acquiring dom 132
124 Anwo, 607 F.2d at 438. 
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Prichard-Ciriza v. I.N.S., 978 F.2d 219, 224 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[I]f [noncitizen 
respondent] had been in the United States on a valid temporary work visa and had achieved 
permanent resident status prior to the expiration of that visa, then the time he was domiciled in the 
United States under the auspices of the visa might well count toward his seven-year minimum.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
128 Id.
129 Melian v. I.N.S., 987 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993). 
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 666 (1978); Melian, 987 F.2d at 1525; Anwo v. I.N.S., 
607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Prichard-Ciriza, 978 F.2d at 224 n.7; Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok 
18
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3. Congressional Intent and the Immigration Reform and Control Act
In 1986, Congress created a program granting amnesty to certain 
undocumented noncitizens, and passed it as part of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA).133  The amnesty program enacted 
through IRCA was meant to ameliorate the circumstances of those 
noncitizens who had made the United States their home.134  The program 
provided a means for certain noncitizens living in the United States to 
legalize their status in the country.135  In addition, in a conference report, 
members of Congress expressed their intent that noncitizens be given 
information about IRCA, including information not only about adjusting 
to permanent resident status, but also “the facilities available to provide 
education and employment training and opportunities in order to meet 
such requirements.”136
This generous allowance evidences congressional intent to reach out 
to undocumented noncitizens and provide them with all the information 
they would need to remain legally in the country.137  Moreover, 
Congressman Theodore Weiss of New York stated that IRCA was “a 
major improvement over earlier efforts” at immigration reform and 
“maintained a relatively generous program of legalization for illegal 
immigrants, and its provisions relating to agricultural workers were 
II), 681 F.2d 107, 108 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982); Francis v. I.N.S., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
133 See IMMIGRATION REFORM & CONTROL ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000 (1986) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840. 
134 Ortega de Robles v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Congress reasoned as 
follows: ‘The United States has a large undocumented alien population living and working within its 
borders.  Many of these people have been here for a number of years and have become a part of their 
communities.  Many have strong family ties here which include United States citizens and lawful 
residents.  They have built social networks in this country.  They have contributed to the United 
States in myriad ways, including providing their talents, labor and tax dollars.  However, because of 
their undocumented status, these people live in fear, afraid to seek help when their rights are 
violated, when they are victimized by criminals, employers or landlords or when they become ill. 
Continuing to ignore this situation is harmful to both the United States and the aliens themselves.  
However, the alternative of intensifying interior enforcement or attempting mass deportations would 
be both costly, ineffective, and inconsistent with our immigrant heritage. The Committee believes 
that the solution lies in legalizing the [status] of aliens who have been present in the United States 
for several years, recognizing that past failures to [enforce] the immigration laws have allowed them 
to enter and to settle here.’”) (citation omitted) (brackets in original). 
135 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840. 
136 Id., at 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5848 (stating that noncitizens should be 
provided with “information respecting the requirements that aliens with lawful temporary residence 
status would have to meet to have their status adjusted to permanent resident status and the facilities 




Seil: United States v. Lopez-Velasquez
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
96 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
tates.
designed to prevent widespread exploitation.”138  Congressman Weiss’s 
comment reinforces the fact that Congress designed IRCA to protect and 
provide for noncitizens living and laboring in the United States.139
Senator Paul Simon of Illinois added, “We are offering legal assistance 
and we provide a legal status for people.”140  Thus, the intent of 
Congress in passing IRCA was to allow certain noncitizens to immigrate, 
that is, to lawfully intend to remain in the United S 141
III. ANALYSIS
Lopez-Velasquez presented the issue of whether Lopez-Velasquez’s 
underlying deportation lacked due process because the immigration 
judge failed to execute his duty to inform Lopez-Velasquez of his 
potential relief under INA section 212(c).142  The duty to inform applies 
when there is a “reasonable possibility” that the noncitizen qualifies for 
relief from deportation.143  Hence, if at the time of his original 
deportation there was a “reasonable possibility” that Lopez-Velasquez 
was eligible for relief, the immigration judge’s failure to inform him of 
this possibility would have rendered the proceeding invalid for lack of 
due process. 
There was a reasonable possibility that Lopez-Velasquez might 
have been eligible for relief under INA section 212(c) at the time of his 
original deportation.144  This section provided relief from deportation for 
a noncitizen who was a legal permanent resident, had seven years of 
“lawful unrelinquished domicile,” and had not served more than five 
years imprisonment for an aggravated felony.145  Lopez-Velasquez’s 
138 132 CONG. REC. E3826-01 (1986). 
139 Id.
140 132 CONG. REC. S16879-01 (1986). 
141 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840. 
142 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
143 Moran-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989). 
144 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 666 (1978); Prichard-Ciriza v. I.N.S., 978 F.2d 219, 224 
n.7 (5th Cir. 1992); Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok II), 681 F.2d 107, 108 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982); Francis v. I.N.S., 
532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Melian v. I.N.S., 987 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993); Anwo v. 
I.N.S., 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
145 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996); Lok II, 681 F.2d at 108 n.2 (“On its face, [§] 212(c) 
grants discretionary relief only to aliens outside the United States who seek to return. We struck this 
limitation down as without rational basis and therefore violative of the fifth amendment to the 
Constitution.  The INS has since applied [§] 212(c) to both resident aliens and aliens seeking to 
return to their residence in the United States. Therefore Lok is not barred from [§] 212(c) relief by 
virtue of his presence in the United States.”) (citations omitted); see also Brent S. Wible, The 
Strange Afterlife of Section 212(c) Relief: Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions 
for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 455, 463-64 (2005). 
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f under section 212(c).
status as a legal permanent resident, and the fact that his criminal 
sentence did not exceed the statutory limit, were never disputed.146  The 
only disputed issue in determining Lopez-Velasquez’s eligibility for 
relief under section 212(c) was whether he had acquired the requisite 
seven years of domicile.147
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S PANEL DECISION
In its initial panel decision, the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the 
test laid out in Moran-Enriquez and found that, due to the changes in the 
law brought about by IRCA, there was a “reasonable possibility” that 
Lopez-Velasquez could have been eligible for relief under section 
212(c).148  The panel pointed out that, approximately one year after 
Lopez-Velasquez was deported, the Ninth Circuit recognized that in 
1986 IRCA had superseded its 1979 decision that noncitizens who were 
not legal permanent residents could not acquire domicile.149  The Ninth 
Circuit also found that if Lopez-Velasquez began to acquire domicile 
with IRCA’s enactment, he would have already met the seven-year 
requirement under section 212(c).150  The court reasoned in the 
alternative that if, as IRCA implied, Lopez-Velasquez began to acquire 
domicile after applying for amnesty, he would still have had a reasonable 
possibility for relief, since he could have acquired the remaining months 
of domicile while in immigration proceedings.151  The court further 
noted that the proper inquiry under the standard it had developed in 
Moran-Enriquez was not whether a noncitizen would be unequivocally 
eligible for relief, but rather whether there was a “reasonable possibility” 
for such eligibility.152  Consequently, the panel found that the 
immigration judge should have informed Lopez-Velasquez of the 
possibility for relie 153
146 See Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895. 
147 Id.
148 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 568 F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled by
United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
149 Id. at 1144. 
150 Id. at 1143-44. 
151 Id. 1144. 
152 Id. at 1143. 
153 Id.
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B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S EN BANC DECISION
In analyzing whether the immigration judge in Lopez-Velasquez’s 
original group deportation had fulfilled his duty to inform, the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc decision focused on the issue of domicile.154  The court 
rejected Lopez-Velasquez’s argument that he had a “reasonable 
possibility” of relief under section 212(c), relying on the 1979 Ninth 
Circuit decision in Castillo-Felix, which held that noncitizens who were 
not legal permanent residents could not acquire domicile for the purposes 
of section 212(c) relief.155  The Ninth Circuit found that Lopez-
Velasquez could not meet the requirements of section 212(c) because he 
had only been a legal permanent resident for four years.156  It reasoned 
that even if Lopez-Velasquez could have acquired domicile in legal, non-
permanent resident status, he would still have been eight months short of 
the required time.157  The court acknowledged that, in certain 
circumstances, such a time difference would not bar relief since a 
noncitizen at that time could acquire time towards domicile while in 
proceedings or awaiting an appeal, but held that this was not such a 
situation.158  Finally, the court dismissed Lopez-Velasquez’s argument 
that he began to acquire domicile when Congress passed IRCA.159
C. THE “REASONABLE POSSIBILITY” THAT LOPEZ-VELASQUEZ WAS 
ELIGIBLE FOR RELIEF UNDER SECTION 212(C)
The duty to inform does not require that the noncitizen actually be 
eligible for relief, but only that a reasonable possibility for relief be 
apparent.160  Under the definition of domicile established by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA)—read in light of the precedent of the United 
States Supreme Court and other circuits, as well as the intent of Congress 
in passing IRCA—there was a reasonable possibility that Lopez-
Velasquez may have been eligible for relief.161  These sources indicated 
that noncitizens who were not permanent residents could lawfully intend 
154 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
155 Id. at 897-900. 
156 Id. 895-96. 
157 Id.
158 Id. at 898. 
159 Id. at 900-01. 
160 Moran-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989). 
161 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 666 (1978); Prichard-Ciriza v. I.N.S., 978 F.2d 219, 224 
n.7 (5th Cir. 1992); Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok II), 681 F.2d 107, 108 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982); Melian v. I.N.S., 
987 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993); Anwo v. I.N.S., 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
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to remain in the United States, and thus establish domicile.162  Whether 
Lopez-Velasquez had indeed acquired the requisite seven years of 
domicile would have been a close question; however, whether he would 
have ultimately prevailed in his claim is not the proper inquiry.163
Rather, the question should be whether there was a “reasonable 
possibility” that Lopez-Velasquez might be eligible for relief.164
Although an immigration judge in the Ninth Circuit is required to 
follow Ninth Circuit precedent,165 this is not the only controlling law—
for example, Congress’s power over immigration is plenary, and thus 
congressional intent should be afforded special weight in immigration 
issues.166  Furthermore, where Ninth Circuit law is out of date or appears 
not to account for a new legal development, the law of other circuits may 
be persuasive or instructive.167  The time of Lopez-Velasquez’s original 
deportation was just such a point.168  As such, there was reason for the 
immigration judge presiding over Lopez-Velasquez’s deportation to 
consider the possibility, suggested by the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court and other circuits,169 that he could be eligible for relief.170
162 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. at 666; Prichard-Ciriza, 978 F.2d at 224 n.7; Lok II, 681 F.2d 
at 108 n.2; Melian, 987 F.2d at 1525; Anwo, 607 F.2d 435. 
163 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 423. 
164 Id.
165 Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A federal agency is obligated to 
follow circuit precedent in cases originating within that circuit.”). 
166 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that over 
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the 
admission of aliens.”) (internal quotations omitted); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”). 
167 See, e.g., Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2002) (“However, neither the 
district court, nor the parties, nor our own research has unearthed Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court 
caselaw on point . . . . We next look to the decisions of our sister Circuits . . . .”). 
168 Ortega de Robles v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1995) (“No decision of this circuit 
has squarely examined the holding and reasoning of Castillo-Felix in light of IRCA.”). 
169 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 666 (1978); Prichard-Ciriza v. I.N.S., 978 F.2d 219, 224 
n.7 (5th Cir. 1992); Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok II), 681 F.2d 107, 108 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982); Melian v. I.N.S., 
987 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993); Anwo v. I.N.S., 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
170 In addition, it may be error for the BIA to assume that old precedent controls a matter 
governed by a new statute that has been passed for a new purpose.  See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 
511, 523 (2009). 
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1. IRCA Beneficiaries Like Lopez-Velasquez Could Lawfully Intend to 
Remain
Congress’s intent in passing the IRCA amnesty legislation under 
which Lopez-Velasquez became a legal immigrant was to provide relief 
and legal status to millions of noncitizens, allowing them to form the 
intent to remain.171  Committee statements from congressional sessions 
stressed the need to acknowledge the presence of many noncitizens 
living and laboring within the borders of the United States.172  Thus, in 
passing IRCA, Congress intended to aid noncitizens in their attempt to 
gain legal status in the United States.  Congress meant for qualifying 
undocumented noncitizens to immigrate through the legal recognition of 
the fact that they were already domiciled in the United States since they 
had made it their home, and intended to remain.173  It would be illogical 
to read a statute allowing noncitizens to apply for immigrant status as 
simultaneously forbidding an intent to immigrate. 
Lopez-Velasquez was one of the noncitizens for whom IRCA was 
written because he was an agricultural worker who had completed the 
labor required by IRCA’s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program 
(“SAW”).174  Because IRCA allowed noncitizens laboring as seasonal 
agricultural workers to form the intent to remain—that is, to immigrate—
Lopez-Velasquez, as a seasonal agricultural worker who intended to 
legalize his status and immigrate, lawfully formed the intent to remain.175
If Lopez Velasquez could lawfully intend to remain in the United States, 
then, by the long-standing definition of domicile—presence and intent to 
remain—he could acquire domicile while he was living in the United 
States in lawful status.176  Thus, for such time as Lopez-Velasquez was 
lawfully present and intended to remain, there was a reasonable 
possibility that he had “lawful unrelinquished domicile” as required by 
section 212(c).177
171 See IMMIGRATION REFORM & CONTROL ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000 (1986) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840. 
172 Id.
173 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1160(a)(1)(B) (Westlaw 2011). 
174 Id.; United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 568 F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled
by United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
175 Id.
176 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 666 (1978); Lopez-Velasquez, 568 F.3d at 1143-44. 
177 See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. at 666; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996). 
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2. The Decisions of the United States Supreme Court and Other 
Circuits Indicated a “Reasonable Possibility of Relief”
Although at the time of Lopez-Velasquez’s deportation the Ninth 
Circuit had not yet squarely held that beneficiaries of IRCA could 
acquire domicile before becoming permanent residents, the Supreme 
Court, BIA, and other circuits had laid the foundation for this 
conclusion.178  The Supreme Court outlined this principle in its 1978 
decision in Elkins v. Moreno when it reasoned that noncitizens who were 
not required to maintain a foreign residence could intend to remain.179
Rather than being required to maintain a foreign residence, 
nonimmigrant noncitizens in the SAW Program were in fact required to 
show residence in the United States before they could be eligible for the 
program.180  Thus, nonimmigrants in the SAW Program were 
“nonrestricted” as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Elkins.181
Since Elkins stated that these “nonrestricted” noncitizens could acquire 
domicile, this inference was fairly before the immigration judge in 
Lopez-Velasquez’s original proceedings. 
Prior to Lopez-Velasquez’s original deportation, other circuits had 
acknowledged the possibility that noncitizens who were not legal 
permanent residents could acquire domicile.182  In particular, the Fifth 
Circuit’s hypothetical in Prichard-Ciriza closely traces the facts of 
Lopez-Velasquez’s original deportation proceedings: Lopez-Velasquez, 
present in the United States (after the SAW Program) on a “valid, 
temporary work visa,” had indeed “achieved permanent resident status 
prior to the expiration of that visa.”183  The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
“the time [the noncitizen] was domiciled under the auspices of the [legal 
nonimmigrant] visa might well count toward his seven year minimum,” 
therefore indicating that such an argument for relief in Lopez-
Velasquez’s case was “reasonably possible.”184  Lopez-Velasquez’s  
178 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. at 666; In re Carrasco, 16 I. & N. Dec. 195, 197 (BIA 1977); 
Francis v. I.N.S., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Anwo v. I.N.S., 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam); Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok II), 681 F.2d 107, 108 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982); Prichard-Ciriza v. I.N.S., 978 
F.2d 219, 224 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992); Melian v. I.N.S., 987 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993). 
179 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. at 666. 
180 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1160(a)(1)(B)(i) (Westlaw 2011). 
181 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. at 666. 
182 Id.; Prichard-Ciriza, 978 F.2d at 224 n.7; Lok II, 681 F.2d at 108 n.2; Francis, 532 F.2d 
268; Melian, 987 F.2d at 1525; Anwo v. I.N.S., 607 F.2d 435. 
183 Prichard-Ciriza, 978 F.2d at 224 n.7; United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 
895-96 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
184 Prichard-Ciriza, 978 F.2d at 224 n.7. 
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“reasonably possible” claim should have alerted the immigration judge 
of his duty to inform. 
The precedents set by the United States Supreme Court, BIA, and 
the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits 
all suggest that “lawful domicile” is not restricted to those with legal 
permanent resident status, but can be accrued by lawful non-residents as 
well.185  These holdings support a “reasonable possibility” that Lopez-
Velasquez was “apparently eligible” for relief from deportation, such that 
the immigration judge had a duty to inform him of his potential relief 
instead of summarily deporting him.186
3. The Ninth Circuit Has Acknowledged That IRCA Made It Possible 
for Non-Permanent Residents to Acquire Domicile
In 1995, the Ninth Circuit held in Ortega de Robles v. I.N.S. that 
beneficiaries of IRCA could lawfully acquire domicile in the United 
States.187  The Ninth Circuit pointed out that its contrary holding in 
Castillo-Felix had been made seven years before the passage of IRCA, 
and that therefore this holding could not be considered conclusive on this 
issue in light of IRCA’s passage.188  It further noted that, even according 
to the reasoning of Castillo-Felix, beneficiaries of IRCA were not 
precluded from acquiring domicile.189  The Ninth Circuit also cited the 
precedent of the Second Circuit in Lok I, which had held that noncitizens 
who could lawfully form the intent to remain could acquire domicile 
outside of permanent resident status.190  The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
domicile for the purposes of relief under section 212(c) could be 
acquired by noncitizens who were not yet legal permanent residents but 
who had applied for the benefits of the amnesty program under IRCA.191
185 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. at 666; Prichard-Ciriza, 978 F.2d at 224 n.7; Lok II, 681 F.2d 
at 108 n.2; Francis, 532 F.2d 268; Melian, 987 F.2d at 1525; Anwo, 607 F.2d 435. 
186 Moran-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Elkins v. Moreno, 
435 U.S. at 666; Prichard-Ciriza, 978 F.2d at 224 n.7. 
187 Ortega de Robles v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1995). 
188 Id. at 1358-59 (“No decision of this circuit has squarely examined the holding and 
reasoning of Castillo-Felix in light of IRCA. Notably, IRCA was enacted over seven years after this 
circuit decided Castillo-Felix. Therefore, the holding of Castillo-Felix does not necessarily apply to 
aliens obtaining legal status under IRCA.”) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 n.5 
(1992) (“It is of course contrary to all traditions of our jurisprudence to consider the law on [a] point 
conclusively resolved by broad language in cases where the issue was not presented or even 
envisioned.”)).
189 Ortega de Robles, 58 F.3d at 1360-61. 
190 Ortega de Robles, 58 F.3d at 1360; Lok v. I.N.S. (Lok I), 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977). 
191 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 568 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled by
United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Ortega de Robles, 58 
26
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Lopez-Velasquez was deported in 1994; however, the holding in 
Ortega de Robles described the change in the law effected by IRCA in 
1986.192  The caselaw and statutes the Ninth Circuit cited in Ortega de 
Robles were in full effect at the time of Lopez-Velasquez’s 
proceedings.193  This legal precedent—including the intent of Congress 
in passing IRCA—was not outside the knowledge of an immigration 
judge; all that needed to be done was to apply the courts’ reasoning to the 
law.194  Such a process does not require the immigration judge to be 
“clairvoyant” as the Ninth Circuit suggested en banc in Lopez-
Velasquez.195  Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Ortega de 
Robles, a finding that non-permanent residents could acquire domicile 
actually comported with the reasoning (if not the conclusion) of Castillo-
Felix.196
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Ortega de Robles encompasses 
Lopez-Velasquez because he had also adjusted his status under IRCA.197
Although it was not clear at the time of his deportation whether Lopez-
Velasquez’s time as a lawfully present noncitizen without permanent 
resident status could be considered “lawful unrelinquished domicile,” it 
was without doubt a “reasonable possibility.”198  The immigration judge 
was not required to ultimately find for Lopez-Velasquez, but only to 
inform him of the possibility that he “may” have been eligible for 
relief.199  The Ninth Circuit’s en banc holding in Lopez-Velasquez,
F.3d at 1360-61. 
192 Ortega de Robles, 58 F.3d at 1360-61. 
193 Id. 1359. 
194 Id. 1360-61. 
195 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting 
Moran-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 884 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
196 Ortega de Robles, 58 F.3d at 1360-61 (“We are convinced that the language cited by the 
INS from Castillo-Felix is inapplicable to the situation now before us. We conclude that a lawful 
permanent resident who gained such status under IRCA § 245A by first becoming a ‘temporary’ 
resident established ‘lawful domicile’ for purposes of § 212(c) as of the date of his or her application 
for amnesty (if a prima facie application was presented at that time). Indeed, much of the reasoning 
in Castillo-Felix supports such a conclusion.”). 
197 Compare United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 568 F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2009), 
overruled by United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), with Ortega
de Robles, 58 F.3d at 1361. 
198 Lopez-Velasquez had a strong argument available that he had accrued at least six years 
and four months of domicile—if he had not waived his right to appeal, he could have easily accrued 
the required domicile while his appeal was pending.  Noncitizens can no longer accrue residence 
while waiting for an appeal; any accrual of residence or domicile now ends at the issuance of the 
charging document.  See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296-97 (2001) (describing the changes 
made by IIRIRA).
199 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 423; see also Michael D. Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens 
Must Be Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 645, 646 (1991). 
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therefore, implies that an immigration judge’s duty to inform does not 
extend to cases where the laws developed outside the Ninth Circuit 
suggest a reasonable possibility of relief.200  This holding runs contrary 
to the purpose of the duty to inform.201
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, the Ninth Circuit assessed the 
reasonable possibility standard without considering whether the external 
legal climate signaled imminent changes in the Ninth Circuit itself.  This 
holding opposes the purpose of the immigration judge’s duty as 
explained in Moran-Enriquez, and whittles away at the already slim due 
process requirements in immigration proceedings.  As a result, 
immigration judges now have less incentive to carefully examine the 
record and the law for potential relief.  This will have an adverse impact 
on the lives of hundreds of thousands of noncitizens seeking to navigate 
the labyrinthine corridors of immigration law.  It will stifle not only 
access to information, but also the ability of noncitizens to make 
informed decisions in the immigration courts and to explore new theories 
in immigration law.  The Ninth Circuit’s limitation on the duty to inform 
will prevent many noncitizens from ever hearing that they might be 
eligible for relief from deportation.  The holding in Lopez-Velasquez
therefore represents a dangerous change in immigration law that will 
impede noncitizens from making informed decisions about issues that 
profoundly impact their lives. 
200 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895. 
201 Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 423; see also Anderson, Case Comment, Aliens Must Be 
Informed of Relief, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. at 646. 
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